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Artificial Intelligence and 
Liability in Health Care 
Frank Griffin† 
Abstract 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is revolutionizing medical care. Patients 
with problems ranging from Alzheimer’s disease to heart attacks to 
sepsis to diabetic eye problems are potentially benefiting from the 
inclusion of AI in their medical care. AI is likely to play an ever-
expanding role in health care liability in the future. AI-enabled 
electronic health records are already playing an increasing role in 
medical malpractice cases. AI-enabled surgical robot lawsuits are also 
on the rise. Understanding the liability implications of AI in the health 
care system will help facilitate its incorporation and maximize the 
potential patient benefits. This paper discusses the unique legal 
implications of medical AI in existing products liability, medical 
malpractice, and other law. 
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Introduction 
Robots armed with artificial intelligence (AI) will replace doctors 
by 2035, according to at least one “legendary Silicon Valley investor,” 
and in some cases, AI is already better than human doctors.1 Today, 
for example, AI can (1) “look at brain scans of people who are exhibiting 
memory loss and tell who will go on to develop full-blown Alzheimer’s 
disease and who won’t,”2 (2) allow hospitals “to predict the likelihood 
of a cardiac arrest in 70 percent of occasions, five minutes before the 
event occurs,”3 and (3) save lives and speed hospital discharge by 
improving treatment for “a deadly blood infection called sepsis.”4 
 
1. Bob Kocher & Zeke Emanuel, Will Robots Replace Drs.?, THE BROOKINGS 
INST. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-
schaeffer-on-health-policy/2019/03/05/will-robots-replace-doctors/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VT2-R2QW] (discussing, for example, a study 
showing that “an artificial intelligence (AI) system was equal or better 
than radiologists at reading mammograms for high risk cancer lesions 
needing surgery[,]” that “computers are similar to ophthalmologists at 
examining retinal images of diabetics[,]” and that “computer-controlled 
robots performed intestinal surgery successfully on a pig[]” with “much 
better” sutures than human surgeons).  
2. Daisy Yuhas, Doctors have trouble diagnosing Alzheimer’s. AI doesn’t, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/
doctors-have-trouble-diagnosing-alzheimer-s-ai-doesn-t-ncna815561 
[https://perma.cc/6DJU-8S4B]. 
3. David Shimabukuro, et al., Effect of machine learning-based severe sepsis 
prediction algorithm on patient survival and hospital length of stay: 
A randomised clinical trial, 4 BMJ OPEN RESP. RES. 1 (2017), 
https://bmjopenrespres.bmj.com/content/4/1/e000234 
[https://perma.cc/R54D-8QV4]. Sony Salzman, How hospitals are using 
AI to save their sickest patients and curb alarm fatigue, NBC NEWS (July 
27, 2019, 6:24 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/how-
hospitals-are-using-ai-save-their-sickest-patients-curb-ncna1032861 
[https://perma.cc/V9K5-C33K]. 
4. Id. (noting that in a 2016 study at the University of San Francisco, the 
“death rate fell more than 12 percent” after the AI system was 
implemented “meaning patients whose treatment involved the [AI] system 
were 58 percent less likely to die in the ICU.” Further, the system sped 
patients’ recoveries with AI monitored patients being “discharged from 
the hospital an average of three days earlier than those who were 
not.”); Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1. 
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AI is being incorporated into health care worldwide.5 By 2030, 
researchers predict that AI may affect up to 14% of global domestic 
product with half of this effect coming from improvements in 
productivity.6 AI will transform healthcare by “deriving new and 
important insights from the vast amount of data generated during the 
delivery of health care every day.”7 AI can quickly and cost-effectively 
analyze previously unscalable data sets (like electronic health record 
data, medical images, laboratory results, prescriptions, and 
demographics) “to make predictions and recommend interventions” in 
patient care.8 The United States “is investing heavily in developing AI” 
as evidenced by the recent executive order from the White House 
establishing the “American AI Initiative” to promote education and 
apprenticeships in U.S. schools to support “the industries of the future 
like . . . algorithms for disease diagnosis.”9 
However, “AI is only as good as the humans programming it and 
the system in which it operates.”10 Generally speaking, AI is defined as 
computer technology designed to perform tasks like, or better than, 
humans.11 AI mimics human intelligence using computer algorithms 
 
5. Thomas Maddox et al., Questions for A.I. in Health Care, 321 JAMA 31, 
31 (2018) (stating, “Artificial intelligence (AI) is gaining high visibility in 
the realm of health care innovation.”).  
6. Robert Challen et al., Artificial Intelligence, Bias and Clinical Safety, 
28 BMJ QUAL. SAF. 231, 231 (2019). 
7. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING BASED 
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) 2 (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/122535/download [https://perma.cc/DE9P-
C7XX]. 
8. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.    
9. Greg Kuhnen & Andrew Rebhan, Doctors beware: A robot doctor just 
matched humans’ diagnostic performance, ADVISORY BOARD, 
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2019/02/13/ai-diagnosis 
[https://perma.cc/9Q45-UM8A]. 
10. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.    
11. Maddox et al., supra note 5 at E1; PRAC. L. INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH., PRACTICE NOTE: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE KEY LEGAL ISSUES: 
OVERVIEW (2021), Westlaw w-018-1743, at 2 [hereinafter AI Key Legal 
Issues] (stating that AI “generally refers to computer technology with the 
ability to simulate human intelligence” by analyzing and learning from 
data “to reach conclusions about it, find patterns, and predict future 
behavior” leading to adaptations that help perform tasks better over 
time); Sonoo Israni and Abraham Verghese, Humanizing Artificial 
Intelligence, 321 JAMA 29, 29 (2019); Pavel Hamet & Johanne 
Tremblay, Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 69 METABOLISM 536, 536 
(2017) (“Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a general term that implies the use 
of a computer to model intelligent behavior with minimal human 
intervention” and “AI is generally accepted as having started with the 
invention of robots,” and “The term [AI] is applicable to a broad range of 
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that learn from existing data by incorporating statistics and 
mathematics on a larger scale than generally possible for humans.12 An 
algorithm is simply sets of computer software code with instructions for 
the computer to perform certain tasks like recognizing patterns, 
reaching a conclusion, or predicting future behavior.13 
AI often involves humans “relinquishing control and entrusting 
artificial intelligence to perform dangerous and complicated tasks”—
like driving an autonomous car or performing a complex surgical 
maneuver.14 Examples of AI already being employed in health care 
include broadly (1) virtual uses relying heavily on informatics like 
machine learning (including artificial neural networks like those used 
in image recognition technology and electronic health record algorithms 
to improve diagnostic accuracy and clinical decision support), and (2) 
physical uses like robotics employing machine perception/motion 
manipulations.15 While there are other AI applications in use in health 
care, this paper will focus on machine learning and on robotics as 
representations of the virtual and physical branches of AI generally 
being used in medicine. 
AI is important in emerging medical law because new technologies 
are one of the biggest drivers of liability risk.16 The American Medical 
Association (AMA) passed its first policy recommendations for AI in 
June 2018.17 One AMA board member noted that AI combined with 
monitoring by “irreplaceable human clinician[s] can advance the 
delivery of [health] care in a way that outperforms what either can do 
alone,” but added that “challenges in the design, evaluation and 
 
items in medicine such as robotics, medical diagnosis, medical statistics, 
and human biology—up to and including today’s ‘omics’.”). 
12. Maddox et al., supra note 5; AI Key Legal Issues, supra note 11; see 
also STEFAN A. MALLEN & THOMAS H. CASE, DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE 
PRODS. LIAB. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:39 NEED FOR STANDARDS IN 
INDUS. USING A.I. (2018–19), Westlaw. 
13. AI Key Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 2 (defining algorithms as “sets of 
code with instructions to perform specific tasks”). 
14. Madeline Roe, Who’s Driving That Car?: An Analysis of Regulatory and 
Potential Liability Frameworks for Driverless Cars, 60 B.C. L. REV. 317, 
337 (2019). 
15. AI Key Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 3 (“Machine learning . . . is AI 
that learns from its past performance . . . .”). 
16. Gerke et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges of Artificial Intelligence-Driven 
Healthcare, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE 295 (June 
26, 2020). 
17. Press Release, Am. Med. Assn., AMA passes first policy recommendation 
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implementation” must be addressed.18 The AMA’s policy recognizes the 
potential legal issues—including liability risks—associated with the 
rapid proliferation of AI use and pledges that the AMA will “[e]xplore 
the legal implications of health care AI.”19 
As recognized by the AMA, AI is likely to play a significant role in 
health care liability cases in the future. Understanding the liability 
implications of AI in health care is necessary to help facilitate its 
incorporation into the health care system.20 This paper provides an 
overview of the unique legal liability issues related to AI use in health 
care. 
I. AI in Health Care 
AI is being rapidly incorporated into health care. Healthcare AI 
projects “attracted more investment than AI projects within any other 
sector of the global economy.”21 Currently, “one-third of hospitals and 
imaging centers report using artificial intelligence . . . to aid tasks 
associated with patient care imaging or business operations.”22 The two 
main branches of AI applications in medicine are physical and virtual.23 
The physical branch includes surgical robots, which will be one focus of 
this article.24 “The virtual branch includes informatics approaches from 
deep learning information to control of health management systems, 
including electronic health records, and active guidance of physicians in 
their treatment decisions” (i.e., clinical decision support systems).25 
A. Surgical Robots 
Surgical robots assist surgeons during surgical procedures in ways 
that are “revolutioniz[ing]” medical care “by allowing surgeons to be 
less invasive, work in smaller areas, and be more precise than when 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. (emphasis added). 
20. Challen et al., supra note 6 (stating that AI’s “clinical value has not yet 
been realised, hindered partly by . . . increasing concerns about 
the . . . medico-legal impact.”). 
21. Varun H. Buch, Irfan Ahmed & Mahiben Maruthappu, Artificial 
Intelligence in Medicine: Current Trends and Future Possibilities, 
68 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 143, 143 (2018). 
22. Jessica Kent, One Third of Orgs Use A.I. in Med. Imaging, Health IT 
Analytics (Jan. 28, 2020), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/one-third-
of-orgs-use-artificial-intelligence-in-medical-
imaging [https://perma.cc/8DED-SQSH]. 
23. Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 11, at 537. 
24. Id. at 539. 
25. Id. at 536. 
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performing the same surgery by hand.”26 “Minimally invasive surgery” 
has been facilitated by surgical robots because the robots help surgeons 
navigate around vital structures with less surgical dissection by creating 
“safe zones” in the surgical field, by automating some functions like 
shutoff of potentially dangerous surgical equipment as it nears vital 
structures, and by helping the surgeon “see” where the instrument is in 
space without requiring actual visual observation of the surgical 
instrument.27 
Robots guide the surgeon in three-dimensional space by tracking 
the movements of the instruments during the procedure using sensors 
(e.g., optical or electromagnetic)28 in the operating room.29 The 
computer and robot alert the surgeon to the precise location and 
orientation in space of the surgical instruments, which can provide vital 
feedback regarding danger to surrounding structures and appropriate 
placement and orientation of medical implants and devices.30 
Many surgical robots use “haptics”—e.g., increased resistance to 
movement at the borders of safe zones—to give the surgeon feedback 
during surgery.31 If the surgeon using the robotic device deviates outside 
the safe zone created by the preoperative surgical planning, the robot 
provides haptic feedback to the surgeon in the form of tactile, auditory, 
or visual alerts that warn the surgeon to the possibility of error.32 Such 
robots define haptic boundaries for the surgical instruments that 
constrain cutting tools within a specific working field, thereby 
preventing injuries outside that field.33 Safety factors, such as push 
back, are used when a haptic boundary is approached and shutting 
down the surgical instrument may be employed when a haptic boundary 
 
26. Roe, supra note 14, at 328; see also Robotic Surgery, MAYO 
CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/robotic-surgery/
about/pac-20394974 [https://perma.cc/G6KG-MNPJ ]. 
27. Martin Roche, Robotic-Assisted Knee Arthroplasty, in 5 
ORTHOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE UPDATE: HIP AND KNEE 
RECONSTRUCTION 163, 163–65 (Michael A. Mont & Michael Tanzer eds., 
2017). 
28. See id. at 165–66. 
29. Id. at 167. 
30. Id. at 165. 
31. Bradford S. Waddell & Douglas E. Padgett, Computer Navigation and 
Robotics in Total Hip Arthoplasty, in 5 ORTHOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE 
UPDATE: HIP AND KNEE RECONSTRUCTION 423, 427 (Michael A. Mont & 
Michael Tanzer eds., 2017). 
32. Id. (“Passive, or haptic, systems require surgical guidance: if deviation 
beyond the boundaries created by the surgical plan occurs, tactile, 
auditory, or visual feedback alerts the surgeon to the possibility of error. 
Haptic systems allow the surgeon to ‘drive’ the robot, thereby allowing 
surgeons to retain some element of control.”). 
33. Roche, supra note 27, at 165. 
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is breached.34 Haptic feedback allows the surgeon to perform the 
procedure without having to directly expose the surrounding tissues for 
visualization, leading to smaller incisions and less unnecessary 
dissection.35 For example, robot-assisted, minimally invasive orthopedic 
surgery often “combines three-dimensional preoperative planning with 
a precisely guided bone resection and implant placement.”36 
Theoretically, robots can also be used to automate procedures such 
that “[c]utting tools and instruments . . . controlled by the robotic arm, 
with no need for surgeon control.” 37 However, fully-automated robotic 
invasive surgical procedures (i.e., “active” robotics) are not currently 
being performed in the U.S.38 Systems in use are either “semi-active” 
such that the robot functions to augment the surgeon by controlling 
surgical maneuvers by guiding and physically constraining the surgeon 
within three-dimensional space or are “passive” such that the robot 
positions the instrument but does not manipulate the patient or 
constrain the surgeon.39 
According to a recent report, the top five robotic surgery systems 
are (1) da Vinci by Intuitive Surgical, (2) Ion by Intuitive Surgical, (3) 
Mako by Stryker, (4) NAVIO by Smith Nephew, and (5) Monarch by 
Auris Health.40 The first robotic surgery device to obtain FDA clearance 
for general laparoscopic surgeries was the da Vinci Surgical System by 
Intuitive Surgical.41 Surgical instruments and a camera are controlled 
by the surgeon who operates using the “Surgeon Console.”42 Using the 
da Vinci system, surgeons can perform operations using minimally 
invasive techniques that previously required more extensive surgeries.43 
Da Vinci is used in around 1,700 hospitals internationally, has been 
used on more than 775,000 patients, and is now used in approximately 




36. Waddell & Padgett, supra note 31, at 427. 
37. Id. 
38. Roche, supra note 27, at 165. 
39. Id. 
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system is often used in “minimally invasive cardiac, colorectal, 
gynecology, head and neck, thoracic, urology, and general surgeries.”45 
Intuitive Surgical also has a robotic surgical system designed to 
allow surgeons to perform lung biopsies using minimally invasive 
techniques with a robotic catheter.46 The device, called Ion, was cleared 
by the FDA’s 510(k) pathway in February 2019.47 Another lung device, 
the Monarch System bronchoscopic device by Auris Health, uses a 
“video game-like controller” during the procedure which the surgeon 
uses to “navigate a flexible robotic endoscope throughout the branches 
of the lungs.”48 The Monarch System offers the surgeon continuous 
bronchoscopic vision, computer assisted guidance, and precise 
instrument control; it was cleared via the FDA’s 510(k) pathway in 
March 2018.49 
Robotics are being used extensively in orthopedic surgery as well.50 
Mako Surgical Corporation created the Mako System to allow 
individualized positioning and minimally invasive approaches to partial 
knee replacement, as well as total hip and knee replacement surgeries.51 
The Mako System uses preoperative CT scans to “generate a 3D model 
of the patient’s bone structure,” which is used to assist surgeons with 
optimal implant placement for that particular patient.52 Stryker, a large 
orthopedic device manufacturer, purchased Mako Surgical Corporation 
for $1.65 billion, highlighting the money and focus on robotics in 
orthopedics.53 Another big orthopedic company, Smith Nephew, has its 
own robotic system called the NAVIO Surgical System to assist with 
total knee replacement surgery.54 The NAVIO system relies upon 
intraoperative bone mapping to generate a 3D model of the patient’s 
bone structure and was approved by the FDA via the 510(k) pathway 
in April 2018.55 The bone model is then used “by the surgeon to 
virtually position the implant and balance tissues” before cutting the 
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the instruments during the procedure based upon the individualized 
bone mapping model.57 
B. Machine Learning 
Machine learning (ML) enables computers to “receive data and 
learn for themselves” from “examples rather than a list of 
instructions.”58 ML uses statistical methods that incorporate algorithms 
to mimic human thought, “allowing computers to make predictions 
from large amounts of patient data, by learning their own associations” 
within the data.59 Using big health care data, “machine learning can 
create algorithms that perform on par with human physicians.”60 ML 
can “account for often unexpected predictor variables and interactions 
and can facilitate recognition of predictors not previously described in 
the literature” and not previously recognized by human researchers.61 
ML comes in a spectrum that varies by the amount of human 
oversight with some ML including more human specification of the 
predictive algorithm’s properties while other ML requires less human 
involvement such that the computer is allowed to learn the algorithm’s 
properties by analyzing data.62 For instance, at one end of the spectrum, 
human statisticians and clinical experts decide “which variables to 
include in the model, the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables, and variable transformations and interactions.”63 
When there is more human involvement, the algorithm is lower on the 
machine learning spectrum.64 
Deep learning is the most advanced part of the “machine learning 
spectrum.”65 Deep learning “refers to a set of highly intensive 
computational models”66 that “allow an algorithm to program itself by 
learning from a large set of examples that demonstrate the desired 
 
57. Id. 
58. Using AI for social good, GOOGLE AI, https://ai.google/education/social-
good-guide/ [https://perma.cc/49A4-7DMD] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
59. Challen et al., supra note 6, at 231. 
60. Andrew L. Beam & Isaac S. Kohane, Big Data and Machine Learning 
in Health Care, 319 JAMA 1317, 1317 (2018). 
61. Ravi B. Parikh, et al., Machine Learning Approaches to Predict 6-Month 
Mortality Among Patients with Cancer, 10 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 8 
(2019). 
62. Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1317–18. 
63. Id. at 1317. 
64. Id. at 1317–18. 
65. Id. at 1317. 
66. Ricardo Miotto et al., Deep Learning for Healthcare: Rev., Opportunities 
& Challenges, 19 BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 1236, 1241 (2018).   
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behavior, removing the need [for humans] to specify rules explicitly.”67 
When fewer assumptions are imposed by humans on the algorithm, 
deep learning is approached, and the computer acts more autonomously 
in decision-making.68 “Deep learning” has been used by technology 
companies like Google and Facebook to analyze “big data” to “predict 
how individuals search the internet, where they travel, what they like 
to purchase, what is their favorite food, and who are their potential 
friends.” 69 
The “intellectual roots of ‘deep learning’” were planted in the 1940s 
and 1950s with the development of “artificial neural network 
algorithms” based loosely “on the way in which the brain’s web of 
neurons adaptively becomes rewired in response to external stimuli to 
perform learning and pattern recognition.”70 Deep learning models 
involve “stunningly complex networks of artificial neurons” in multiple 
layers of neural networks performing “highly intensive computational 
models” designed to produce increasingly accurate models from raw 
data.71 Deep learning can revolutionize health care by allowing doctors 
to identify which patients may develop particular diseases, to identify 
“which patients need to be seen more frequently,” to identify which 
patients need to be “treated more aggressively,” and to determine the 
most appropriate specific treatments (“i.e., precision medicine”).72 
Two examples where deep learning is being applied today are 
medical image analysis and clinical decision support. 
1. Medical Image Analysis 
Medical images contain a large amount of complex data. Deep 
learning is being applied to medical images and diagnosis in ways that 
facilitate physicians’ decision-making process by providing support in 
 
67. Varun Gulshan et al., Development and Validation of a Deep Learning 
Algorithm for Detection of Diabetic Retinopathy in Retinal Fundus 
Photographs, 22 JAMA 2402, 2402 (2016). 
68. Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1317. 
69. Tien Yin Wong & Neil M. Bressler., Artificial Intelligence With Deep 
Learning Technology Looks Into Diabetic Retinopathy Screening, 
316 JAMA 2366, 2366 (2016). 
70. Andrew L. Beam & Isaac S. Kohane, Translating Artificial Intelligence 
Into Clinical Care, 316 JAMA 2368, 2368 (2016) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Lawrence Carin & Michael Pencina,
On Deep Learning for Medical Image Analysis, 320 JAMA 1192, 1192 
(2018) (“Successful neural networks for such tasks [as identifying natural 
images of everyday life, classifying retinal pathology, selecting cellular 
elements on pathological slides, and correctly identifying the spatial 
orientation of chest radiographs] are typically composed of multiple 
analysis layers; the term deep learning is also (synonymously) used to 
describe this class of neural networks.”). 
71. Beam & Kohane, supra note 60; Miotto, supra note 66. 
72. Wong, supra note 69, at 2366. 
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analyzing complex data sets like (1) clinical images, (2) radiology 
images, and (3) pathology slides. 
Deep learning is being applied to clinical image analysis. In one 
example, researchers demonstrated “a deep learning algorithm capable 
of detecting diabetic retinopathy . . . from retinal photographs at a 
sensitivity equal to or greater than that of ophthalmologists.”73 The 
algorithm learned “the diagnosis procedure directly from the raw pixels 
of the images with no human intervention outside of a team of 
ophthalmologists who annotated each image with the correct 
diagnosis.”74 In another example, the photographs of skin lesions were 
being analyzed by AI to diagnose skin cancers.75 Using this technology, 
theoretically, a layperson could take the photograph and allow the 
computer to review the image and report the diagnosis. 
Similarly, deep learning is being used to analyze complex radiology 
images and is being used for “diagnostic decision support . . . using 
algorithms that learn to classify from training examples (i.e., supervised 
learning).”76 A radiologist “typically views 4000 images in a CT scan of 
multiple body parts (“pan scan”)” in polytrauma patients.77 Searching 
for a hidden fracture in a pan scan can be like “searching for needles in 
haystacks” leading to visual fatigue, which may make radiologists more 
likely to fail.78 
In contrast, deep learning learns as it analyzes more images and has 
a “boundless capacity for learning.”79 Watson—IBM’s prototype for 
AI—”can identify pulmonary embolism on CT and detect abnormal 
wall motion on echocardiography.”80 With over 30 billion images 
available to analyze, Watson “may become the equivalent of a general 
radiologist with super-specialist skills in every domain.”81 For example, 
AI algorithms “can look at brain scans of people who are exhibiting 
memory loss and tell who will go on to develop full-blown Alzheimer’s 
disease and who won’t,” which scientists believe will “accelerate the 
discovery of therapies” to treat Alzheimer’s disease by identifying 
“participants for drug or lifestyle interventions at the earliest stages of 
dementia.”82 
 
73. Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1317. 
74. Id. 
75. Challen et al., supra note 6. 
76. Id. 
77. Saurabh Jha and Eric Topol, Adapting to A.I.: Radiologists and 





82. Yuhas, supra note 2. 
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Likewise, deep learning can be used in pathology. Deep learning can 
be applied to “whole-slide pathology images” potentially improving 
diagnostic accuracy and efficiency. 83 For example, for breast cancer 
lymph node slides, “some deep learning algorithms achieved better 
diagnostic performance than a panel of 11 pathologists.”84 The deep 
learning algorithm produced results “comparable with an expert 
pathologist interpreting whole-slide images without time constraints.”85 
The usefulness in a clinical setting of this approach is being evaluated. 
86 Another study showed that AI “could predict the grade and stage of 
lung cancer” with “superior accuracy” compared to human 
pathologists.87 
2. Clinical Decision Support 
AI-enabled clinical decision support (CDS) systems are being used 
by physicians to interpret large amounts of data in patients’ medical 
records—like laboratory results, imaging studies, radiology reports, 
EKGs, fitness tracker data, genetic testing, family history, medications, 
hospital admission history, and countless other data points.88 
Computerized alerts provided by CDS systems inside the patients’ 
electronic medical records (EMR) are already in widespread use and 
offer health care providers “targeted and timely information that can 
improve clinical decisions”89 and “reduce clinical error.”90 EMR-
incorporated CDS systems generally “sit quietly in the background of 
the hospital’s computer systems, diligently tracking vital sign monitors 
and then sending doctors a text message or other notification at the 
first sign of trouble.”91 EMR-based CDS systems are having significant 
“impact providing guidance on safe prescription of medicines, guideline 
 
83. Babak Ehteshami Bejnordi, et al., Diagnostic Assessment of Deep 
Learning Algorithms for Detection of Lymph Node Metastases 
in Women with Breast Cancer, 318 JAMA 2199, 2199 (2017). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Li-Qiang Zhou et al., Lymph Node Metastasis Prediction from Primary 
Breast Cancer US Images Using Deep Learning, 294 RADIOLOGY 19, 19 
(2020) (“Using US images from patients with primary breast cancer, deep 
learning models can effectively predict clinically negative axillary lymph 
node metastasis.”). 
87. Jha, supra note 77, at 2354.   
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adherence, [and] simple risk screening . . . .”92 In addition, CDS systems 
“are being developed to provide other kinds of decision support, such 
as providing risk predictions (eg, for sepsis) based on a multitude of 
complex factors, or tailoring specific types of therapy to individuals.”93 
For example, CDS systems can be used to individualize dosing of 
medication and radiation treatments. Some systems try approaches to 
“personalized treatment problems such as optimizing a heparin loading 
regime to maximize time spent within the therapeutic range or 
targeting blood glucose control in septic patients to minimize 
mortality.”94 Similarly, for radiation dosing, “[s]ystems . . . can analyze 
CT scans of a patient with cancer and by combining this data with 
learning from previous patients, provide a radiation treatment 
recommendation, tailored to that patient which aims to minimize 
damage to nearby organs.”95 
CDS systems can also use predictions to save lives by improving 
physician decision-making. For example, AI is allowing hospitals to 
“predict the likelihood of a cardiac arrest in 70 percent of occasions, 
five minutes before the event occurs.”96 In addition, use of an AI-
enabled EKG machine resulted in more rapid identification of patients 
with a difficult-to-identify heart condition.97 Similarly, AI is saving lives 
by improving treatment for “a deadly blood infection called sepsis”98 
and to predict “impending sepsis from a set of clinical observations and 
test results.”99 In fact, in a 2016 study at the University of San 
Francisco, the “death rate fell more than 12 percent” after the AI 
system was implemented, “meaning patients whose treatment involved 
the [AI] system were 58 percent less likely to die in the ICU.” 100 Further, 
the system sped patients’ recoveries with AI-monitored patients being 
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“discharged from the hospital an average of three days earlier than 
those who were not” AI-monitored.101 
AI can also simplify life for health care providers in ways that 
improve patient outcomes. For example, AI is being used in intensive 
care units (ICUs) to make “life . . . less chaotic for doctors and nurses” 
by decreasing the number of false positive alarms associated with simple 
vital sign monitors, which can create “alarm fatigue” for health care 
workers leading them to ignore the alarms or even turn them off.102 For 
example, in traditional ICUs, nurses “respond to an alarm every 90 
seconds” with two out of three of those alarms being false positives—
meaning they “don’t signal real danger.”103 The FDA estimated that 
“alarm-related problems contributed to more than 500 patient deaths 
from 2005 to 2008.”104 AI alarm systems are better because AI “is often 
able to predict problems hours in advance,” so that “doctors and nurses 
get a calm, text message warning rather than having to respond to an 
urgent alarm signaling that a patient is already in trouble.”105 
II. Theories of Liability for AI in Medicine 
Currently, there is minimal case law regarding AI liability in 
medicine.106 Legal liability frameworks under products liability law, 
medical malpractice law, and ordinary negligence are likely to be 
applied to AI liability with some novel twists discussed below.107 
A. Products Liability 
Traditional products liability law has generally provided the 
framework to hold the “seller, manufacturer, distributor, or any other 
party in the distribution chain” liable for physical injury or damage 
caused by machines or tools, regardless of whether the product acts 
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autonomously or is assisted by a human.108 For example, products 
liability law has been applied to AI-like products such as autopilot in 
airplanes and automated vehicle controls like cruise control and 
automatic parking.109 The Restatements, and consequently many states, 
say that a “product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, 
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings.”110 Each of these 
categories of product defect present some unique issues when applied to 
AI. 
1. Design Defect 
Design defect claims have been common in the few surgical robot 
claims available for review111 and are likely to be common in other 
medical AI claims. According to the Restatements, “a product is 
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe.”112 There are several 
ways that AI might include the elements of (1) foreseeable risks, (2) 
reasonable alternative design, and (3) not reasonably safe. 
Note that a design defect claim “is a strict liability claim, and 
therefore, the plaintiff [is] required to prove that the manufacturer 
proximately caused the malfunction that led to the injuries,” which 
requires “the plaintiff to prove that the machine, rather than the doctor, 
caused the injury.”113 Causation is a difficult part of design defect claims 
for AI due to the complex way that “artificial intelligence and human 
oversight are intertwined,” and this issue is further discussed under 
medical malpractice below.114 
a. Foreseeable Risks 
AI algorithms include some unique foreseeable risks. For a product 
to be defective, the risks must be foreseeable such that, “[o]nce the 
plaintiff establishes that the product was put to a reasonably 
foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are generally known or 
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reasonably knowable by experts in the field.”115 Common knowledge 
that is attributable to experts in the field is imputable to manufacturers 
of AI.116 AI includes foreseeable risks common to many other types of 
products like malfunction, user error, normal wear and tear, among 
other things, which are likely to present similar issues and have similar 
liability profiles to non-AI products and therefore, are not discussed 
here. Some unique foreseeable risks discussed here associated with AI 
include bad data, discrimination, corruption, and others. 
i. Bad Data 
AI’s deep learning depends upon quality data, with some experts 
noting “there is nothing more critical than the data.”117 Large amounts 
of data are involved in health care interactions. If the AI uses bad data 
to generate models, it “can be amplified into worse models” than non-
AI models.118 The AMA’s AI policy includes priorities of transparency 
and reproducibility,119 which are reliant upon having good data. Factors 
involving data that can cause flaws in deep learning outcomes include 
(1) data volume, (2) data quality, (3) temporality, (4) domain 
complexity, and (5) interpretability. 
First, data volume is required. In health care “the number of 
patients is usually limited in a practical clinical scenario.”120 In order to 
meet its goal of accuracy and improved outcomes, a “huge amount of 
data” is required; “while there are no hard guidelines about the 
minimum number of training documents, a general rule of thumb is to 
have at least about 10 [times] the number of samples as parameters in 
the network.”121 So in domains where a “huge amount of data can be 
easily collected,” like image or speech recognition, deep learning can be 
 
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §2 cmt. m (1998). 
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very successful.122 In clinical decision-making from EMRs, 
“understanding diseases and their variability is much more 
complicated” than image or speech recognition, and the “amount of 
medical data that is needed to train an effective and robust deep 
learning model would be much more comparing with other media.”123 
Second, data quality is required, and health care data are not 
typically as “clean and well-structured” as data in other domains. 
Because “health care data are highly heterogeneous, ambiguous, noisy, 
and incomplete,” data quality must be questioned and considered in 
training a good deep learning model, which leads to special challenges 
considering “data sparsity, redundancy, and missing values.”124 
Third, temporality of data is important. Deep learning models often 
“assume static vector-based inputs” that do not adapt to changes over 
time; this can be problematic in medicine where “diseases are always 
progressing and changing over time.”125 Fourth, data complexity is 
important. In health care, “diseases are highly heterogenous and for 
most diseases there is still no complete knowledge on their causes and 
how they progress.”126 Fifth, interpretability is important. To convince 
medical professionals regarding “the actions recommended from the 
predictive system (e.g., prescription of a specific medication, potential 
high risk of developing a certain disease),” deep learning models will 
need to be transparent and not an opaque black box—which is different 
than many domains.127 
The maxim of “garbage in, garbage out” is especially important 
when applying AI models to health care data, and special care must be 
taken to ensure that the data upon which AI models are based is good.128 
ii. Discrimination 
Theoretically, AI systems “make objective decisions and do not 
have the same subjective biases that influence human decision 
making.”129 However, in reality, “AI systems are subject to many of the 
same biases” as human decision-making because AI is often trained 
using imperfect data sets.130 “[W]ithout proper awareness and control 
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within datasets—or can ‘learn’ biases” during the process of machine 
learning.131 The AMA AI policy includes avoiding bias and avoiding 
exacerbation of disparities for vulnerable populations among its 
priorities for AI systems.132 
There are numerous ways bias can be introduced by AI. First, AI 
biases can result from “under-representation” in datasets of some 
populations that may “hide population differences in disease risk or 
treatment efficacy.”133 In one example, researchers “found that 
cardiomyopathy genetic tests were better able to identify pathogenic 
variants in white patients than patients of other ethnicities.”134 
Second, “nonrepresentative data collection” can result in bias.135 
For example, data sets gathered from apps and wearables “may skew 
toward socioeconomically advantaged populations with greater access 
to connected devices and cloud services.”136 Likewise, expensive genetic 
testing results in datasets that are skewed toward richer consumers.137 
The location of the dataset can also contribute to bias and 
nonrepresentative data collection. For example, data collected from 
EMRs comes from health systems that have implemented such EMR 
systems, which may lead to underrepresentation of “the uninsured and 
underinsured and those without consistent access to quality health care 
(such as some patients in rural areas).138 Further, EMR data can 
introduce bias when it is collected for patient care and billing instead 
of for research because important “clinical contextual information” can 
be missing.139 
Third, care must be taken to make sure AI is not applied unfairly. 
For example, if a machine learning system is used to predict 6 to 12 
month mortality rates to help physicians with prognostic projections 
regarding hospice care, it should not be used to “withhold treatment 
from patients with a higher mortality risk.”140 
 
131. Id. 
132. AMA Policy, supra note 17. 






139. Id.; “Clinical context” means interpreting data in the context of the 
patient’s other symptoms. Doctors must look at patients holistically, i.e., 
look at the whole patient. AI may just look at data points and make a 
mistake where it fails to consider the whole clinical picture. See also 
Section III.A.1.b. 
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Fourth, an AI system can reflect the biases of its developers and 
users.141 Therefore, diversity in developers, users, teams, health care 
professionals, and medical experts is necessary to avoid bias and 
discrimination.142 In addition, AI scientists “must continue to develop 
analytical techniques to detect and address unfairness in AI-driven 
technologies.”143 
iii. Corruption and Industry-Led Bias 
AI raises the possibility of “abhorrent” corruption filtering into 
clinical decision support tools, as shown by a recent $145 million 
settlement with the DOJ by an EMR vendor in the “first ever criminal 
action against an EHR vendor.”144 Pharmaceutical companies and other 
medical supply vendors may gain access to clinical decision support 
tools and use those tools to direct doctors to prescribe their products. 
For example, in January 2020, an EMR vendor paid the DOJ $145 
million to settle criminal and civil investigations related to its admission 
that it “solicited and received kickbacks from a major opioid company 
in exchange for utilizing its EHR software to influence physician 
prescribing of opioid pain medications” by manipulating its EMR 
software.145 According to the DOJ, the EMR company, Practice Fusion, 
“extracted unlawful kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies in 
exchange for implementing clinical decision support (CDS) alerts in its 
EHR software designed to increase prescriptions for their drug 
products.”146 According to the DOJ, the EMR company—”in exchange 
for ‘sponsorship’ payments”—allowed pharmaceutical companies to 
“participate in designing the CDS alert, including selecting the 
guidelines used to develop the alerts, setting the criteria that would 
determine when a health care provider received an alert, and in some 
cases, even drafting the language used in the alert itself”; this was done 
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from the opioid company and other pharmaceutical companies.”). 
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“in ways aimed at increasing the sales of the companies’ products” and 
“did not always reflect accepted medical standards.”147 For example, 
the criminal information detailed by the DOJ alleged that “Practice 
Fusion solicited a payment of nearly $1 million from the opioid 
company to create a CDS alert that would cause doctors to prescribe 
more extended release opioids” and “touted that it would result in a 
favorable return on investment for the opioid company based on doctors 
prescribing more opioids.”148 
The Assistant Inspector General noted, “‘As new technologies 
continue to develop and evolve, so too do new and innovative fraud 
schemes.’”149 Civil claims could follow for patients injured by criminal 
activity, and companies could be liable for failing to prevent criminal 
activity during development of their products. Liability could be 
present for doctors who failed to recognize deviations from clinical 
practice guidelines and for hospitals that did not adequately investigate 
potential fraud under liability theories mentioned elsewhere in this 
paper. 
iv. Other Unique Foreseeable Risks 
AI’s complex and rapidly developing applications create 
innumerable foreseeable risks beyond the scope of this paper that will 
become apparent as AI continues to be implemented in the medical 
field. The AMA Policy foreshadows a few potential risks that will be 
briefly mentioned here.150 For example, the AMA Policy states that the 
AMA will help “integrate the perspective of practicing physicians into 
the development, design, validation and implementation of health care 
AI” and sets a priority of “best practices in user-centered design.”151 
The AMA states that “a major source of dissatisfaction in physicians’ 
professional lives” is physicians’ “frustrations with electronic health 
records . . . especially usability issues.”152 If AI developers fail to 
adequately consider the end user, then foreseeable risks are present that 
are unique to the health care environment.153 Physicians are commonly 
known to be extremely busy with limited time to address complex 
patient issues, so AI that hinders the flow of care, disrupts physicians’ 
workflow, or distracts physician decision-making foreseeably causes 
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issues may face liability for design defects where injury may have been 
prevented by making the device more user-centric. 
Other foreseeable risks include inadequate end-user training, loss of 
patient privacy, inadequate security to protect patient data, and other 
risks. 
b. Reasonable Alternative Designs 
Another factor in determining whether a product is defective is 
whether adopting a reasonable alternative design (RAD) could have 
reduced the risk of harm.155 The possibilities for AI RAD are many. 
First, RAD options may include devices without AI. A human-only 
interaction may be better than an AI-facilitated interaction in some 
situations. Often, human “clinicians make assumptions and care choices 
that are not neatly documented as structured data” and often rely on 
clinical “intuition” developed from human experiences.156 “[D]octors 
make decisions on more than just the data available in a patient’s 
chart,”157 which leads some to describe medicine as both an “art” and a 
science.158 In other words, “clinical judgment is not well represented by 
data” in medicine.159 For example, AI may fail to recognize context of 
data. Context of data is important, and machines may have problems 
with data taken out of context where the machine fails to recognize 
artifacts.160 In one example, AI missed context in evaluating the risk of 
death from pneumonia at the University of Pittsburg Medical Center 
(UPMC) when AI determined that the risk of death was lower in 
pneumonia patients over 100 years of age and in patients with asthma 
arriving at the emergency department.161 The AI algorithm “correctly 
analyzed the underlying data” but failed to understand the context that 
“their risk was so high that the emergency department staff gave these 
patients antibiotics before they were even registered into the electronic 
medical record,” which made the time stamps for the “lifesaving 
antibiotics” inaccurate.162 If the AI predictions had been taken out of 
context, then pneumonia patients over 100 years of age and those with 
 
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
156. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.    
157. Kuhnen & Rebhan, supra note 9. 
158. The ”Art” and ”Science” of Medicine, 184 JAMA 142, 142 (1963), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/664090. 
159. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.    
160. Verghese et al., supra note 117, at 19 (“For example, a model might 
classify patients with a history of asthma who present with pneumonia as 
having a lower risk of mortality than those with pneumonia alone, not 
registering the context that this is an artifact of clinicians admitting and 
treating such patients earlier and more aggressively.”). 
161. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.    
162. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
AI and Liability in Health Care 
86 
asthma could have been treated less aggressively—leading to likely 
deaths and additional harm to these high-risk populations.163 
Sometimes AI can interfere with important human components of 
medicine—like touch, compassion, and empathy—that many recognize 
as part of the art of medicine. Illness is more than just a physical or 
biological experience.164 The doctor-patient relationship includes 
elements like touch, compassion, empathy, context, and other human 
elements that AI alone cannot provide.165 The “placebo effect” has been 
found across medical fields, from surgery, to back pain treatments, to 
medications suggesting that the mind can play an important part in 
illness not represented by data on the patient’s chart.166 Medicine is not 
purely a science that can be managed with statistics, mathematics, and 
computer algorithms, and overreliance on AI may lead to harm in 
instances when human compassion, human touch, or human 
interpretation of data context is necessary. For example, when a robot 
recently delivered the news to a patient and his family that he would 
die soon from cancer, news outlets, the family, and experts were all 
aghast.167 “[A] tall machine on wheels . . . rolled into the [patient’s] 
room [in the hospital]” with “a screen streaming a live video of a doctor 
wearing a headset [attached].”168 The doctor delivered the news of the 
poor CT scan results and recommended morphine to keep the patient 
comfortable, while the robot stood on the side of the patient’s bad ear 
where he barely seemed to understand.169 The patient died within 48 
hours.170 The patient’s daughter said, “‘It should have been a 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/science/telemedicine-ethical-
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human’ . . . ‘It should’ve been a doctor who came up to his bedside.’”171 
In evaluating the incident, the AMA president said, “‘We should all 
remember the power of touch—simple human contact—can 
communicate caring better than words’.”172 One medical ethicist noted, 
“technology may not be sensitive enough to pick up nuanced social cues, 
like body language and tone of voice, in an emotionally charged 
moment.”173 
However, for many AI systems, the argument that humans alone 
are better as a RAD will likely fail because even when AI systems have 
notable issues, they still often outperform humans alone. For example, 
in total hip replacement surgery, there is a notable learning curve for 
surgeons placing the acetabular cup, with surgeons obtaining better 
positioning after their first 50 cases.174 However, even the first 50 
placements are better than for non-AI navigated hips.175 
Second, for RAD options, choosing a different data set, a modified 
software design, different clinical practice guidelines, or some other 
technological changes based on expert testimony are likely to be more 
fruitful for plaintiffs in most instances than suggesting eliminating the 
AI altogether. For example, RADs for surgical robots might include 
using different sensory techniques for sensors in the rooms (e.g., optical 
vs. electromagnetic). Simplified navigational procedures may also be a 
RAD proposal where robotic computer navigation is associated with 
significant learning curves for surgeons.176 
Third, user-interface modifications to make the human/AI 
interaction better will be an obvious point for RAD consideration. The 
AMA policy emphasizes the importance of “best practices in user-
centered design” and the need for companies to “integrate the 
perspective of practicing physicians into the development, design, 
validation and implementation of health care AI.”177 When companies 
fail to do so, they open themselves up to RAD arguments. Based upon 
the AMA’s mention of physicians’ “frustrations with electronic health 
records (EHRs), especially usability issues,” as a “major source of 
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ripe point to target faulty AI in design defect claims.178 One example of 
a case where a RAD could include some user interface change involved 
a May 2009 article entitled “Nearly Killed by E-Records Data Model.”179 
The article described the experience of an ICU patient who was “nearly 
killed” because of an EMR system “that did not allow doctors and 
nurses to access critical medical information or obtain medication from 
the pharmacy in a timely fashion.”180 A RAD here might simply be a 
more user-friendly interface. The possibilities for RAD are endless for 
AI and will continue to evolve over time. 
c. Not Reasonably Safe 
In Restatement jurisdictions, the jury must find that the device at 
issue in the trial is “not reasonably safe.”181 Other states have adopted 
modifications of the Restatement language, using phrases like 
“unreasonably dangerous.”182 If the state uses the “Consumer 
Expectations Test,” generally the device sold “must be dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be expected by the ordinary 
consumer.”183 Reasonableness is also often analyzed using risk-utility 
balancing as described by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.184 Other reasonableness factors, like those identified 
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183. David Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and 
Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 134–35 (2014) (noting that 
if the state uses the consumer expectations test it may define an 
“unreasonably dangerous” product as one with a defect that makes the 
product “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it”). 
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998); 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
185. John W. Wade, On The nature of Strict Tort Liability for 
Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973). 
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AI will likely shift the definition of “reasonableness.” For instance, 
in the case of an AI system, the focus will be on whether the AI system 
performed as well as it should, not whether it performed as safely as a 
reasonable human-alone system.186 Ironically, a 1966 court recognized 
the issue well before AI was in common use in discussing liability 
standards: 
A human being, no matter how efficient, is not a mechanical robot 
and does not possess the ability of a radar machine to discover 
danger before it becomes manifest. Some allowances, however 
slight, must be made for human frailties and for reaction, and if 
any allowance whatever is made for the fact that a human being 
must require a fraction of a second for reaction and cannot 
respond with the mechanical speed and accuracy such as is found 
in modern mechanical devices . . . 187 
The Louisiana court foreshadows the argument that a “mechanical 
robot” may be held to a higher standard.188 Today, the court will not 
ask whether the AI performed as well as a reasonable human; instead, 
the question will be whether the AI performed as well as it was supposed 
to perform based on the performance of other AI systems and the 
performance specifications of the manufacturer.189 
AI systems may also be unreasonably dangerous when the human-
user interface is too difficult or when the systems do not make 
allowances for the humanness of their users. EMRs may be particularly 
susceptible to this argument. For example, one EMR vendor faced a 
class-action lawsuit alleging software defects that threatened patient 
safety and that also entangled hospitals that adopted the EMR; the 
class-action complaint was led by a patient’s estate who died of cancer 
allegedly because “‘he was unable to determine reliably when his first 
symptoms of cancer appeared [as] his medical records failed to 
accurately display his medical history on progress notes.’”190 The 
 
186. Vladeck, supra note 183, at 132 (noting that the court in a driverless car 
case will “likely ask whether the car involved in the accident performed 
up to the standards achievable by the majority of other driver-less cars, 
as well as the performance specification set by the car’s manufacturer” 
and not whether it performed up to the standards of human drivers). 
187. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 132. 
190. Lawsuit Claims EHR Dangerous to Patients, Could Affect 
Hospitals, RELIAS MEDIA (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.reliasmedia.com/
articles/142432-lawsuit-claims-ehr-dangerous-to-patients-could-affect-
hospitals [https://perma.cc/994J-5DP6]. Complaint at 16, Tot 
v. eClincal Works, LLC, No. 17-8938 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/004-
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complaint also alleged that the software failed to “reliably record 
diagnostic imaging orders,” provided “insufficient audit logs,” had 
“issues with data portability,” and was not compliant with criteria 
required for certification.191 
Unfriendly EMR user-interfaces can create a good argument for 
unreasonable dangerousness. One observer noted, “most EMRs serve 
their frontline users quite poorly.”192 “The redundancy of the notes, the 
burden of alerts, and the overflowing inbox has led to the ‘4000 
keystrokes a day’ problem’ and has contributed to, and perhaps even 
accelerated, physician reports of symptoms of burnout.”193 When 
doctors spend all of their time on computers, patient care suffers.194 
EMRs may provide significant opportunities for “unreasonably 
dangerous” arguments. For example, in one medical malpractice case, 
the physician allegedly did not have adequate space to document the 
patient’s symptoms, which allegedly led to the mismanagement of the 
patient’s condition resulting in a heart problem.195 In another case, a 
patient’s diagnosis of and treatment for cancer was allegedly delayed 
for years because the EHR system used by the provider referred the 
physician to outdated imaging.196 Each of these issues might provide a 
foundation for a plaintiff to argue that the EMR was “unreasonably 
dangerous” in a design defect claim. 
EHR-related risks are due to system technology and design issues 
or due to user-related issues.197 According to one study, the top system 




191. RELIAS MEDIA, supra note 189. 
192. Verghese et al., supra note 117, at 19. 
193. Id. 
194. See id (“The unanticipated consequences include the loss of important 
social rituals (between physicians and between physicians and nurses and 
other health care workers) around the chart rack and in the radiology 
suite, where all specialties converged to discuss patients.”). 
195. Penny Greenberg & Gretchen Ruoff, Malpractice Risks Associated with 




196. Vera Lücia Raposo, Electronic Health Records: Is it a Risk Worth Taking 
in Healthcare Delivery?, 11 GMS HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT 1, 
2 (2015); see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 179, at 1525–26 
(listing benefits of EHRs). 
197. Darrell Ranum, Electronic Health Records Continue to Lead to Medical 
Malpractice Suits, DOCTORS COMPANY (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.thedoctors.com/articles/electronic-health-records-continue-
to-lead-to-medical-malpractice-suits/ [https://perma.cc/TE6W-MZMV]. 
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failure in 12% of EMR-related claims from 2010 to 2018, (2) lack of, or 
failure of, EMR alerts or alarms in 7% of claims, (3) fragmented record 
in 6% of claims, (4) failure/lack of electronic routing of data in 5% of 
claims, (5) insufficient scope/area for documentation in EMR in 4% of 
claims, (6) lack of integration/incompatible systems in 2% of claims, 
and (7) other issues in 14% of claims.198 Only one claim in this study 
involved failure to ensure information security.199 
Expert testimony will be required for most “unreasonably 
dangerous” AI arguments. 200 The AI industry will have an 
overwhelming advantage of access to AI experts, much like that 
described for orthopedic devices.201 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
the trial court serves as a “gatekeeper” to prevent unreliable and 
irrelevant scientific testimony from entering the courtroom.202 Four 
nonexclusive factors are to be used by trial courts to determine the 
reliability of expert testimony, including: “‘(1) whether the ‘scientific 
knowledge . . . can be (and has been) tested’; (2) whether ‘the theory 
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication’; (3) 
‘the known or potential rate of error’; and (4) ‘general acceptance.’”203 
Importantly, AI manufacturers will have decisive advantages in all four 
of those factors. First, the AI companies will likely be the ones doing 
the scientific testing, which may bias research outcomes. Second, peer 
review and publication will likely be performed by AI scientists working 
for companies, again introducing bias. Third, any known or potential 
error rate will likely be discovered by AI companies, which may limit 
disclosure. Fourth, general acceptance will be up to AI scientists 
working for AI companies, which may limit the field of witnesses willing 
to testify on behalf of injured plaintiffs. 
2. Manufacturing Defect 
According to the Restatements, “a product contains a 
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended 




200. Roe, supra note 14, at 330, 339. 
201. See Frank Griffin, Prejudicial Interpretation of Expert Reliability on the 
‘Cutting Edge’ Enables the Orthopedic Implant Industry’s Bodily 
Eminent Domain Claim, 18 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 207, 237–38 (2017). 
202. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 145–47 (1999). 
203. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213, 
at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (noting, “Daubert makes clear that the 
factors it mentions do not constitute a definitive checklist or test. 
(emphasis in the original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)”).  
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and marketing of the product.”204 Strict liability typically applies.205 
“Generally, to establish a claim for strict liability, ‘a plaintiff must 
demonstrate, inter alia, that the product was defective, that the defect 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, and the defect existed at the time the 
product left the manufacturer’s control.’”206 The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts says that liability “applies although (a) the seller has exercised 
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the 
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller.”207 
One example of an alleged AI manufacturing defect involved the da 
Vinci robot, which the plaintiff alleged had “microcracking” allowing 
“electricity to escape in the form of sparks” from monopolar curved 
scissors dubbed “Hot Shears” resulting in “internal burns to [the 
plaintiff’s] rectum” during a robotically-assisted prostatectomy.208 
Expert testimony is almost always required to establish claims for strict 
products liability.209 A court in a prior case had found that “the da 
Vinci robot is a complex machine, one in which a juror would require 
the assistance of expert testimony in order to reasonably determine if 
the robot had a defect;” 210 thus, the court decided that the operative 
report of the surgeon describing the “narrative of the robot failing to 
function properly” was not adequate because the surgeon did “not opine 
that the robot ha[d] a defect.”211 The court also noted that the surgeon 
may have “used that same da Vinci robot in dozens of previous 
operations without any trouble,” seeming to imply that this might show 
it was not defective.212 Without expert testimony, summary judgment 
was granted for the defendant.213 
 
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
205. Id. 
206. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x 925, 926 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citation omitted). 
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965); Mracek v. 
Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 404 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 363 
F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (In states where the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A has been adopted, ”§ 402A 
‘imposes strict liability in tort not only for injuries caused by the defective 
manufacture of products, but also for injuries caused by defects in their 
design.’”). 
208. Pohly v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 15-CV-04113-MEJ, 2017 WL 900760, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). 
209. See, e.g., Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (noting that without 
an expert report, the plaintiff failed to establish a claim for strict liability). 
210. Id. at 405. 
211. Id. at 405–06. 
212. Id. at 406. 
213. Id. at 406–07. 
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Manufacturing defects for AI are likely to be treated similarly to 
other manufacturing defects, and therefore, are not covered extensively 
here. 
3. Failure to Warn 
According to the Restatements, “a product is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller . . . and 
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not 
reasonably safe.”214 
Some argue that some AI products are “unavoidably unsafe” under 
the Restatements.215 For example, the Washington Supreme Court 
considered the da Vinci robot as “unavoidably unsafe” and held that 
the manufacturer of the da Vinci system failed to fulfill its duty to warn 
the hospital and surgeon about the robot.216 An unavoidably unsafe 
 
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
216. Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 187 Wash.2d 743, 769 (2017) 
(noting that an exception to strict liability for products liability is 
provided by comment k for unavoidably unsafe products only when the 
manufacturer provides adequate warning of the unavoidably unsafe nature 
of their product); Comment k states: 
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in 
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being 
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially 
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the 
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not 
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences 
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a 
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are 
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk 
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, 
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other 
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason 
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the 
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many 
new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time 
and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no 
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but 
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the 
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of 
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the 
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he 
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful 
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently 
reasonable risk. 
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product is “one that is unable to be made safe for its intended and 
ordinary use” and therefore, carries with it a duty to warn the users of 
the product.217 A manufacturer may qualify for an exception to strict 
liability under comment k only if it provides proper warnings and 
marketing to the end user.218 
In the Washington da Vinci case, the patient’s intraoperative 
complication was a laceration of the rectal wall caused by the surgical 
robot that required the doctor to convert the operation to an open 
procedure and bring in another surgeon to repair the rectal tear.219 The 
patient ultimately died four years later, after suffering through 
numerous subsequent complications allegedly related to the rectal tear 
including incontinence, the need for a colostomy bag, respiratory failure 
requiring a ventilator, kidney failure, infection, neuromuscular damage 
causing difficulty with walking, among others.220 
The Washington State Supreme Court created “an unexpected shift 
in the law with regards to the standard that applies to medical device 
manufacturers’ duty to warn”221 when it held “that device 
manufacturers are indeed liable for ensuring that their product is safely 
adopted by its users.”222 The decision has major implications for 
hospitals, surgeons, and physician leadership and “seem[s] to destroy 
the learned intermediary doctrine.”223 Washington became “the first 
state to impose a duty on medical device manufacturers to warn 
hospitals” about surgical robots.224 
 
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
217. Roe, supra note 14, at 340. 
218. Taylor, 187 Wash.2d at 743. 
219. Id. at 750. 
220. Id. 
221. Catherine Mullaley, Washington Supreme Court Holds That Medical 
Device Manufacturers Have A Duty to Warn Hospitals—Taylor v. 
Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 43 AM. J. L. & MED. 165, 168 (2017). 
222. Jason Pradarelli, et al., Who is Responsible for the Safe Introduction 
of New Surgical Technology? An Important Legal Precedent from the Da 
Vinci Surgical System Trials, 152 JAMA 717, 717 (2017). 
223. Mullaley, supra note 221, at 168. 
224. Nathan Reeves, Medical Device Manufactures’ Duty to Warn 
Expands, MED. DEVICE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2017), http://knobbemedical.com/
medicaldeviceblog/article/washington-state-supreme-court-modifies-
duty-warn-device-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/AQM4-7HKL]. 
Roe, supra note 14, at 328–40 (observing that the Washington Supreme 
Court held the manufacturer liable even though the surgeon (1) was 
performing his first unproctored da Vinci prostatectomy, (2) performed 
the procedure on the patient whose level of obesity was clearly outside 
the recommended parameters provided by the manufacturer, (3) 
performed the procedure in a surgical position not recommended by the 
manufacturer (i.e., the patient was not in the Trendelenberg position), 
and (4) performed the surgery on the patient who had undergone previous 
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AI is associated with a learning curve.225 For example, in total hip 
replacement surgery, the learning curve for robot-assisted navigation 
results in notable improvements in acetabular cup placement after 50 
cases.226 Reducing learning curves and preparing hospitals and surgeons 
to safely use AI devices falls at least partially to the manufacturer. At 
least one company is using virtual reality training to train surgeons. 
Smith and Nephew, an orthopedic device maker, “recently collaborated 
with Osso VR, a surgical training company, to create a module for the 
NAVIO Surgical System.”227 The NAVIO training module “is designed 
to be used by practicing surgeons and residents who are learning the 
robotics-assisted procedure and involves clinically supported virtual 
reality (VR) simulations of the procedure.”228 As companies institute 
these types of training, some type of similar VR training may become 
a “reasonable” expectation in products liability cases, effectively raising 
the standard of care for companies and surgeons alike—so that by the 
time a surgeon performs their first robotic surgery on a patient, a 
significant amount of VR training may become the norm. By requiring 
the doctor who is using new AI to participate in learning activities 
before clinical use, the companies may help satisfy their duty to warn 
under products liability law. 
B. Medical Malpractice 
AI adds an additional layer of complexity (e.g., adding superseding 
causes and mitigation of damages) to medical malpractice cases, with 
minimal current law available to help with the evaluation.229 Generally, 
physicians “must provide care at the level of a competent physician 
within the same specialty, taking into account available resources.”230 
In applying AI in health care, the “key step [is] separating prediction 
from action and recommendation” with the machine making the 
prediction and the human deciding upon recommendations and 
actions.231 One observer noted, “Proper interpretation and use of 
computerized data will depend as much on wise doctors as any other 
 
lower abdominal surgeries—again against the recommendations of the 
company). 
225. See Claudia Perlich, Learning Curves in Machine Learning, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MACH. LEARNING (2011), https://www.tcs.com/blogs/
human-learning-curve-for-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/Y999-
HQHK]. 
226. Waddell & Padgett, supra note 31, at 425. 
227. Carfagno, supra note 40. 
228. Id. 
229. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765 (noting, “there is essentially no case 
law on liability involving medical AI.”); Roe, supra note 14, at 330. 
230. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765. 
231. Verghese et al., supra note 117, at 19. 
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source of data in the past.”232 Medical malpractice elements include 
duty, breach, causation and damages. AI can have unique effects on 
each of these elements. 
1. Duty and Breach 
Physicians have a duty to provide the human interface for AI so 
that data are interpreted properly and so that recommendations make 
clinical sense. EMRs and their clinical decision support (CDS) tools are 
adding “an army of new liability risks” which physicians must now 
navigate because EMRs have been ubiquitously adopted by “almost all 
health care entities.”233 In alleged malpractice cases, “more discoverable 
evidence” is available than ever before because EMRs increase the 
amount of documentation of clinical decisions.234 Doctors have a duty 
to make sure that the EMR data relied upon for clinical decisions is 
correct and evaluated. EMRs tempt doctors “to copy and paste patient 
information and data” instead of adding new information, which may 
“perpetuat[e] . . . prior inaccuracies” and lead to missing new 
information or information that has changed.235 Email and 
telecommunication encounters with patients are “multiplying the 
number of patient encounters manifold” and may lead to a concomitant 
increase in malpractice claims; these encounters may also “heighten the 
risk if medical advice is offered without a recorded physical examination 
and a comprehensive investigation of patients complaints.”236 The 
physician’s duty does not change just because the communication is 
electronic. 
In addition, AI has the ability to deliver “information overload” 
that “may lead to physicians missing important clinical information 
amid the noise and chaos.”237 The physician has a duty to navigate this 
information overload with expertise.238 Improved access to patients’ 
clinical information via EMRs will likely create additional legal duties 
to act upon that information.239 The physician may also have a duty to 
use health information exchanges “to search the extensive data 
generated by health care providers” as EMR systems become more 
 
232. Id. 
233. Zachary Paterick et al., Medical Liability in the Electronic 
Medical Records Era, 31 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROC. 558, 558 (2018). 
234. Id. (observing, “Clinical decisions are extensively documented, creating 
more discoverable evidence including metadata.”). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 559. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 558. 
239. Id. at 559 (stating, ““Better access to clinical information through EMRs 
may create legal duties to act on the information.”). 
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interconnected.240 In addition, with increasing development of health 
information exchanges, physicians could be subject to a legal duty to 
review outside records for which they have not previously been held 
responsible—again changing the standard of care.241 Given that most 
physicians only have 15-20 minutes to “take a history, examine a 
patient, and review the EMR” and given the large amount of extraneous 
information contained in today’s electronic health records, with records 
often being hundreds or even thousands of pages, required review of all 
of this information as part of the standard of care may often be 
unreasonable.242 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, EMRs are playing an increasing role in 
medical malpractice lawsuits, with claims involving EMRs tripling from 
2010 to 2018.243 Overall, however, EMR-related cases were only 1.1 
percent of claims closed since 2010 in one study.244 But as adoption 
continues at an almost-universal level, these cases are likely to increase 
in frequency. In one example, a physician gave the patient a morphine 
dose over 10 times the dosage intended by clicking the wrong selection 
on the EHR’s drop down menu, which only offered either 15 or 200 
milligram dosages.245 
EMRs are usually deemed contributing factors in medical 
malpractice claims rather than the primary cause. 246 In one study, 
EMR-related factors that contributed to patient harm included user 
error in 17%, incorrect information in the record in 16%, copy/paste 
errors in 14%, “conversion issues (hybrid paper & electronic records)” 
in 13%, and system/software design issues in 12%.247 User-related errors 
include copy and paste errors where users copy and paste redundant, 
outdated, or erroneous information, propagating it throughout the 
patient’s chart, often making it difficult for physicians and nurses to 
 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 560. 
242. Id. 
243. Ranum, supra note 197 (“The Doctors Company’s analysis of claims in 
which EHRs contributed to injury show a total of 216 claims closed from 
2010 to 2018. The pace of these claims grew, from a low of seven cases in 
2010 to an average of 22.5 cases per year in 2017 and 2018.”). 
244. Id. (“The Doctors Company’s analysis of claims in which EHRs 
contributed to injury show a total of 216 claims closed from 2010 to 2018. 
The pace of these claims grew, from a low of seven cases in 2010 to an 
average of 22.5 cases per year in 2017 and 2018.”). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Greenberg & Ruoff, supra note 195 (focusing on concerns raised by 
unintended consequences of HIT). 
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sort through the chart to make good decisions and can lead to patient 
injury.248 
In medical malpractice cases, physicians breach their legal duties 
when they fail to meet the standard of care, which means that 
physicians are generally “held to a standard of learning and skill 
normally possessed by such specialists in the same or similar locality 
under similar circumstances” or some similar standard dependent upon 
state law.249 The legal standard of care is not fixed and is constantly 
evolving.250 The standard of care is almost always a “matter peculiarly 
within the knowledge of experts,” so expert testimony is usually 
required to establish the relevant standard of care.251 As one physician 
commentator noted, “sooner rather than later,” with AI entering 
medical practice, “physicians need to know how law will assign liability 
for injuries that arise from interaction between algorithms and 
practitioners.”252 
AI will rapidly influence the standard of care.253 As noted earlier, 
AI can currently (1) “look at brain scans of people who are exhibiting 
memory loss and tell who will go on to develop full-blown Alzheimer’s 
disease and who won’t,”254 (2) allow hospitals “to predict the likelihood 
of a cardiac arrest in 70 percent of occasions, five minutes before the 
event occurs,”255 and (3) save lives and speed hospital discharge by 
improving treatment for “a deadly blood infection called sepsis.”256 At 
some point, as each of these technologies become more widely available, 
each may become a part of the “standard of care” for treating patients 
 
248. Sue Bowman, Impact of Electronic Health Record Systems on Information 
Integrity: Quality and Safety Implications, PERSP. HEALTH INFO. 
MGMT. 1,4 (Fall 2013) (calling attention to safety hazards of EHRs). 
249. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213, 
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019). 
250. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765 (pointing out, “The legal standard of 
care is key to liability for medical AI, but it is not forever fixed. Over 
time, the standard of care may shift.”). 
251. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213, 
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Paterick et 
al., supra note 233, at 560. 
252. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1766. 
253. Id. 
254. Yuhas, supra note 2. 
255. Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro et al., supra note 3, at 1. 
256. Salzman, supra note 3 (In fact, in a 2016 study at the University of San 
Francisco, the “death rate fell more than 12 percent” after the AI system 
was implemented “meaning patients whose treatment involved the [AI] 
system were 58 percent less likely to die in the ICU.” Further, the system 
sped patients’ recoveries with AI monitored patients being “discharged 
from the hospital an average of three days earlier than those who were 
not.”); Shimabukuro et al., supra note 3, at 1. 
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with the respective issues. Early adapters risk stepping outside the 
“standard of care” when other doctors are reluctant to embrace new 
AI-powered technologies, whereas late adapters also risk violating the 
standard of care if they fail to adopt beneficial AI that most other 
doctors have already accepted. One physician observer noted that 
current medical malpractice law “incentivizes physicians to minimize 
the potential value of AI,”257 saying that the safest way for physicians 
to use AI to avoid liability is as a “confirmatory tool to support existing 
decision-making processes, rather than as a source of ways to improve 
care.”258 However, where AI use becomes mainstream, reluctant 
physicians could end up on the wrong side of the standard of care for 
widely adopted, clearly beneficial AI because “the failure to adopt and 
use electronic technologies may establish a deviation from the standard 
of care.”259 
EMR and other AI clinical decision support systems “may reshape 
medical liability by shifting the standard of care.”260 Doctors who decide 
to vary treatment from AI-powered “clinical decision support guidelines 
may represent a risk for malpractice liability based on a violation of 
new standards of care.”261 Departure from the recommendations of an 
EMR or other clinical decision support system could be used as evidence 
of medical malpractice as a departure from the standard of care.262 
Similarly, physicians could be protected from liability by following AI 
recommendations—even if those recommendations are incorrect.263 If 
the doctor supersedes or overrides the EMR’s default, the physician 
may need to be prepared to defend that decision in court.264 If juries 
rely too much on these EMR defaults, erroneous liability may be 
assigned.265 
Surgical robots also change the standard of care. Surgeons who 
adopt robotic techniques early risk violating the standard of care if 
robot-less surgeries clearly outperform robot-assisted procedures. 
Similarly, surgeons who fail to adopt robotic techniques may violate the 
standard of care once the robotic systems become widely accepted and 
have better outcomes than non-robotic techniques. 
Mitigation of damages caused by the robot and competent use of 
AI are part of the standard of care. Surgeons do relinquish some control 
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during robotic surgery but maintain control over the robots and are 
responsible for mitigating any damages a robot may cause during 
surgery.266 For example, in a case involving the Da Vinci system, the 
expert opined that “generally accepted standards [require] the operating 
surgeon to identify [a puncture caused by the robot] and correct[] this 
issue prior to completion of the surgery.”267 
Surgeons must also maintain their surgical skills in traditional 
techniques to mitigate damages when robots and computerized options 
inevitably and foreseeably fail. This can be problematic when surgeons 
are trained to only perform procedures using robot-assisted techniques. 
For example, in a recent case, the da Vinci robot displayed multiple 
“error” messages and neither the surgical team nor the company 
representative was able to make the robot functional, so the surgeon 
had to use “laparoscopic equipment instead of the robot for the 
remainder of the surgery.”268 The patient suffered complications after 
the robot malfunctioned that he alleged were due to the robot 
malfunction and surgeon error.269 When a robot fails, a surgeon must 
have maintained the skills necessary to finish the procedure without the 
robot, which can become problematic if the surgeon has rarely, if ever, 
performed the procedure without the robot. At some point, the 
standard of care might become to abort the procedure until the robot 
is repaired rather than risk complications by performing the procedure 
in a way in which they are only vaguely familiar. 
2. Causation 
As human and AI interactions are intertwined, proving causation 
can become difficult for plaintiffs. In medical malpractice cases, 
“causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability 
based upon competent expert testimony” or a similar state law 
standard.270 Causation must also be proven in products liability cases. 
Specifically, in one surgical robot case, the “plaintiff was required to 
prove that the manufacturer proximately caused the malfunction that 
led to the injuries,” and thus, “prove that the machine, rather than the 
doctor, caused the injury.”271 The plaintiff’s failure to prove proximate 
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causation by the manufacturer led to dismissal of the case.272 In a 
medical malpractice case, the opposite would be true; for example, the 
plaintiff would have to show that the doctor, and not the machine, 
caused the damage. In AI cases, the intricate relationship between 
human and machine exacerbate “the difficulty of proving causation, 
especially when artificial intelligence and human oversight are 
intertwined.”273 The entanglement of human versus machine liability 
can “make a technical, factual determination of who [the doctor or the 
AI device] was responsible” difficult for a jury and will require expert 
testimony.274 
3. Damages 
AI opens up the possibility of new types of damages in medicine. 
For example, AI-enabled EMRs can provide patients and doctors with 
the opportunity for “early advance care planning conversations,”275 and 
eventually, failure to have these conversations may make physicians 
liable for the consequences of patients dying without planning. Doctors 
and patients have traditionally dealt with “[p]rognostic uncertainty and 
optimism bias” that often leads “patients and clinicians to overestimate 
life expectancy, which can delay important conversations.”276 In cancer 
care, one of the key reasons for this deficiency is that “oncology 
clinicians cannot accurately identify patients at risk of short-term 
mortality using existing tools.”277 Therefore, “most patients with cancer 
die without a documented conversation about their treatment goals and 
end-of-life preferences and without the support of hospice care.”278 
Today, however, AI-enabled EMRs can be used to “accurately 
identify patients at high risk of short-term mortality in general medicine 
settings,”279 which may give patients the opportunity for end-of-life 
planning that previously may not have been possible. Today, “oncology 
specific ML algorithms can accurately predict short-term mortality 
among patients starting chemotherapy.”280 In a recent study, “ML 
models based on structured EHR data accurately predicted the short-
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practices.”281 These tools “could be very useful in aiding clinicians’ risk 
assessments for patients with cancer as well as serving as a point-of-
care prompt to consider discussions about goals and end-of-life 
preferences.”282 Clinicians agreed that “most patients flagged . . . were 
appropriate for a timely conversation about goals and end-of-life 
preferences” suggesting that “ML tools hold promise for integration into 
clinical workflows to ensure that patients with cancer have timely 
conversations about their goals and values.”283 
At some point, failure to provide these end-of-life discussions could 
lead to damages for which physicians could become liable. As AI 
proliferates throughout medicine, more novel damage theories will likely 
become evident. 
C. Other Liability Theories 
Other theories of liability are likely to include ordinary negligence 
and breach of warranty. However, AI-related issues are likely to be 
largely similar to law in other areas for these theories, so they are only 
mentioned briefly here. 
1. Negligence by the Owner of the AI 
The hospital or other owner of the AI system will have liability for 
ordinary negligence for issues related to the proper care and 
maintenance of the AI equipment.284 For example, in a recent case 
involving the Mako total knee robot, the plaintiff alleged that the 
hospital “failed in its duty owed plaintiff as the owner and custodian 
responsible for ensuring the ‘proper care, maintenance and performance 
of’ the Mako system.”285 
Hospitals could also be liable for negligence for adopting impractical 
and overly burdensome AI EMR systems. EMRs are creating liability 
issues by compromising patient safety due to something one author 
termed “death by a thousand clicks.”286 Physicians are being overloaded 
with the task of creating and interpreting the EMR with “many doctors 
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say[ing] they spend half their day or more clicking pulldown menus and 
typing rather than interacting with patients.”287 When hospitals 
implement new EMR systems without adequate physician input and 
training, foreseeable injuries may occur for which the hospital could be 
liable under ordinary negligence theories. In addition, the hospital can 
be liable for the doctor’s mistakes using its AI system under vicarious 
liability theories even if the doctor is an independent contractor.288 
In some cases, AI can even endanger hospital employees. For 
example, one nurse recently filed a lawsuit including claims of 
negligence and loss of consortium for a “traumatic brain injury” 
allegedly suffered during her employment by a hospital when, “while 
assisting during a surgery, [she] fell over a stool when the robotic arm 
of a ‘da Vinci Surgical System’ . . . ’moved rapidly and unpredictably 
toward her causing her to step back to avoid coming in contact with 
it.’”289 
2. Breach of Warranty 
Plaintiffs may allege breach of express and implied warranty.290 One 
approach taken by a plaintiff in a robot case involved alleging that the 
manufacturer’s “advertising and promotional materials ‘did not 
accurately reflect the serious and potentially fatal side effects’” of the 
AI.291 In another case, the doctors informed the patient that they would 
use the da Vinci robot to minimize the chance of erectile dysfunction 
associated with radical prostatectomy.292 The patient had allegedly 
expressed concern over the potential complication and otherwise may 
not have consented to the procedure without the robot, which may help 
form the foundation for a case.293 The same standards that apply from 
 
287. Id. 
288. Roe, supra note 14, at 332 (noting ”[i]n addition to products liability, the 
use of surgical robots also raises the question of vicarious liability”). 
289. Patrico v. BJC Health Sys., No. 4:19-CV-01665-SNLJ, 2019 WL 3947781, 
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2019). 
290. See, e.g., Reece v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Ala. 
2014) (alleging breach of express and implied warranty, among other 
claims). 
291. Darringer v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-00300-RMW, 2015 WL 
4623935, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2015). 
292. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402 (E.D. Pa. 
2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the doctor 
“informed [the plaintiff] that the da Vinci surgical robot (“robot”) would 
be used for the radical prostatectomy, so as to minimize the risk of erectile 
dysfunction.”). 
293. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
AI and Liability in Health Care 
104 
§402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts apply to breach of 
warranty that apply to strict liability.294 
3. AI as a “Person” 
Some futurists argue that “machines capable of independent 
initiative and of making their own plans . . . are perhaps more 
appropriately viewed as persons than machines,” and therefore, should 
be subject to liability themselves.295 If machines are viewed as legal 
persons, then the machine itself could be held liable and be required to 
keep adequate insurance.296 However, as long as the machine can be 
linked to a person or recognized legal entity, current product liability, 
negligence, and medical malpractice laws are likely to suffice—so legal 
recognition of machines as persons seems to be speculative and probably 
unnecessary at this time. 
Conclusion 
Artificial intelligence is revolutionizing medical care while 
simultaneously creating novel liability issues for providers and 
manufacturers. By mimicking human intelligence using computer 
algorithms that can learn from vast amounts of data, AI has the 
potential to outperform human physicians. Virtual systems like EMR 
and other clinical decision support systems augmented by AI are 
already ubiquitous in health care systems. Physical systems like AI-
enabled robots are becoming more common in surgical procedures 
ranging from total knee replacements to radical prostatectomies. AI is 
showing promise to improve the care of patients with many different 
types of diseases noted throughout this paper from Alzheimer’s disease 
to heart attacks to sepsis, among others. 
New technologies like AI are important drivers of liability risk. In 
order to maximize the potential of AI, liability risks need to be defined 
so that all parties understand their responsibilities and the legal 
implications when technology inevitably causes harm. Current legal 
frameworks for products liability, medical malpractice, and ordinary 
negligence are likely to provide the foundation for liability analysis of 
AI systems with some twists specific to AI. In products liability law, 
the usual risks for design defects are present similar to other medical 
products. Uniquely foreseeable AI-specific design risks include data 
flaws, discrimination and bias, corruption and industry influence, user-
interface issues, privacy compromise, and security issues, among others 
that will develop as AI use increases. 
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Human touch, compassion, clinical intuition, and empathy are 
important components of medical care that have led many to describe 
medicine as an “art” as well as a science, so there will likely remain 
many instances in which predominantly human medical care will 
outperform AI-dominated care. However, AI is likely to play an 
increasing role in medical decision-making going forward. 
For many types of medical issues, new measures for when an AI 
product is “not reasonably safe” will arise, and AI will likely be held to 
a higher standard than humans alone as AI systems will be compared 
to other AI systems and to manufacturer performance standards. 
Expert testimony will be especially important in AI cases and will likely 
represent a considerable barrier for many plaintiffs, as experts may be 
scarce or unwilling to testify against their potential employers. AI 
manufacturing defect liability will likely mirror that of other medical 
devices. “Failure to warn” defects in AI cases will likely be based in 
failure to train the end users, overpromising results, overly-steep 
learning curves. At least one court has already concluded that an AI 
system was “unavoidably unsafe.” Causation issues will play a role in 
outcomes as juries will have to decide whether the physician or the AI 
manufacturer was responsible for the plaintiff’s injury. 
AI also affects medical malpractice liability by adding a complex 
layer of issues like superseding causes and mitigation of damages. Wise 
doctors will remain as important as ever in applying AI to medicine in 
ways to maximize benefits to patients. AI will create new duties for 
physicians to adopt and properly use AI as new technologies become 
the prevailing standard of care. AI will move the standard of care in 
medical malpractice cases with both early and late adapters potentially 
facing liability issues. 
AI will create new liability risks for doctors as it leads to more 
discoverable evidence and the potential for information errors related 
to the overwhelming amount of data, as well as the mixture of 
erroneous/old data with correct/current information (e.g., copy and 
paste errors) in medical records. EMR involvement in medical 
malpractice cases tripled over the past decade and is likely to continue 
to climb as EMR adoption becomes universal. 
Doctors’ decisions to either follow or go against AI predictions will 
have legal consequences. Doctors who are trained on AI and never learn 
to practice without it may have difficulties when computers fail, which 
could lead to liability issues if the doctor is not prepared to complete a 
surgery, for instance, without a robot. Causation issues will likely play 
a large role because it will be hard for juries to dissect liability when 
physician responsibilities are so intertwined with AI systems. Again, 
expert testimony will be key. AI also may create new areas of liability 
where, for example, AI may allow doctors to warn patients prior to bad 
events, so that patients can be better prepared for illness or end of life, 
and failure to provide this information may lead to new areas of 
damages (e.g., similar to loss of chance theories). 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
AI and Liability in Health Care 
106 
Other liability frameworks will also play a more conventional role 
in AI-related claims, like ordinary negligence for maintenance and 
repair of AI or breach of warranty claims. Current liability frameworks 
are likely to suffice for AI systems in medicine, so it is unlikely that AI 
will rise to the level of personhood in the law of liability. All parties 
involved have unique responsibilities in dealing with AI. Manufacturers 
must ensure data is good, algorithms valid, and systems 
nondiscriminatory, in addition to ensuring the usual care in 
manufacturing to avoid defect. Manufacturers must also make sure the 
AI is not a black box and that end users are aware of its limitations 
and potential flaws, as well as ensuring that the users are properly 
trained to use their AI. Hospitals must properly maintain their AI and 
make sure their employees are properly trained in its use. Doctors must 
be the human interface between the technology and the patient by 
analyzing context for AI outputs and continuing to provide the human 
elements (e.g., compassion, empathy, clinical intuition) of good medical 
practice. As outlined in this paper, existing legal frameworks should 
provide the parties involved with AI’s proliferation reasonable ability 
to anticipate liability issues so that AI continues to rapidly 
revolutionize medical care. 
